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The Sixth Circuit addressed the timely issue of qualified immunity in the 
disturbing case of Bard v. Brown County, 970 F.3d 738 (6th Cir. 2020).1 Ashley 
Bard brought a civil suit against Brown County and a handful of individual 
officers after the hanging death of her brother, Zachary Goldson, in Brown 
County Jail.2 Id. at 2. The alarming sequence of events in the final thirty-seven 
minutes of Mr. Goldson’s life lead to two very different analyses of qualified 
immunity at the district court and the Sixth Circuit.3 Compare id. at 14–18 with 
Bard v. Brown Cty., No. 1:15-cv-643, 2019 WL 590357 at *12 (S.D. Ohio Feb. 
13, 2019) [hereinafter District Court]. Ultimately, these approaches reflect very 
different standards of accountability for law-enforcement and this disparity 
frustrates a consistent and fair application of the law. 
After being discharged from a local hospital at approximately 2:20 a.m. Mr. 
Goldson attacked Deputy Travis Justice who restrained him with the help of 
medical personnel until additional officers arrived.4 Id. at 3. One of the 
responding officers was Deputy Ryan Wedmore who proceeded to rain 
obscenities on Mr. Goldson including stating that he would “like to break 
[Goldson’s] fucking neck right now” and that Mr. Goldson “is getting a 
welcome party when we get to the jail.”5 Id. at 4. When the fully restrained Mr. 
Goldson returned to the jail in a police cruiser, Corporal Jason Huff dragged 
him out of the back seat by his leg shackles so that his upper body crashed to 
the ground.6 Id. at 4; WCPO 9, Zachary Goldson Case: Jail Video Shows Final 
Seconds of Inmate’s Life, YOUTUBE (Feb. 9, 2015). Correctional Officers (CO) 
George Dunning and Zane Schadle escorted Mr. Goldson to his cell and 
removed most of Mr. Goldson’s restraints.7 Bard, 970 F.3d at 3. They left Mr. 
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Goldson in his cell at 2:34 a.m. and then returned to find him hanging at 2:58 
a.m.8 Id. at 5. 
In the aftermath of Mr. Goldson’s death, no criminal charges were filed 
against any of the officers involved. Ms. Bard then brought a civil suit “claiming 
that [her brother’s] hanging was staged” among “other civil-rights and state-law 
violations,” 9 but the district court granted the officers qualified immunity based 
on a standard of substantial discretion. 10 Id. at 2; See District Court, at *12. On 
appeal, the Sixth Circuit considered two remaining issues: “(1) what claims the 
plaintiff, Ashley Bard, preserved for appeal, and (2) whether she presented 
sufficient evidence to defeat a motion for summary judgment on those 
claims.”11 Bard, 970 F.3d at 33. All three Sixth Circuit Judges wrote separately 
with the majority of Ms. Bard’s claims held forfeit due to procedural 
deficiencies.12 Id. However, Judge Moore’s opinion concerning the removal of 
Mr. Goldson from the police cruiser by Corporal Huff, applied a three-part test 
for qualified immunity that reflects an objective standard and sharply contrasts 
with the district court’s approach.13 Id. at 14–18. 
Even the district court paid lip service to an objective standard for qualified 
immunity before deferring to Corporal Huff and effectively allowing the officer 
to pardon himself. The district court acknowledged “that government officials 
performing discretionary functions generally are shielded from liability for civil 
damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory 
or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.”14 
District Court at *10 (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). 
But comparing the district court’s analysis to Judge Moore’s analysis on the 
Sixth Circuit exposes wildly different understandings of the law. 
First, the district court points out that Mr. Goldson’s “autopsy found only 
minor abrasions to his cheek or nose” and proceeded to trivialize this injury.15 
Id. at *12. Next, the district court cites two Supreme Court cases stressing the 
difficult job of law-enforcement and prison guards with an emphasis on granting 
officers “substantial discretion” but leaves out the Supreme Court stressing in 
both cases that officers should be held to an objective standard.16 Id. (citing 
Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396 (1989); Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 135 
S.Ct. 2466, 2474 (2015)). Finally, the district court accepted Corporal Huff’s 
testimony “that he removed Goldson from the car by his leg shackles because 
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he wanted to act quickly to prevent Goldson from attempting to escape again.” 
Id. 
The problem with the district court’s analysis is that it does not square with 
precedent and does not reflect the available evidence for three reasons. First, the 
amount of force required to cause minor abrasions is not trivial because “a 
plaintiff may allege use of excessive force even where the physical contact 
between the parties did not leave excessive marks or cause extensive physical 
damage.”17 Bard, 970 F.3d at 17 (quoting Ingram v. City of Columbus, 185 F.3d 
579, 597 (6th Cir. 1999)). Second, the incredibly difficult job of law-
enforcement and prison officers does require substantial discretion, but there are 
also bright-line rules like when “someone has been restrained with handcuffs, 
the need for force is near ‘nonexistent.’”18 Id. at 16 (quoting Kalvitz v. City of 
Cleveland, 763 F. App’x 490, 494 (6th Cir. 2019)). Third, Mr. Goldson’s attack 
of Deputy Justice was too physically and temporally attenuated to justify the 
reasonableness of Corporal Huff’s actions given that “Goldson was a known, 
secured inmate, and no record evidence indicates that the officers were uncertain 
whether he had been effectively restrained in the cruiser.” Id. at 17. With the 
district court’s analysis for qualified immunity falling flat, Judge Moore’s 
analysis offers a well-reasoned and replicable approach. 
Judge Moore’s analysis for qualified immunity has three prongs: “(1) 
whether a constitutional right was violated; (2) whether that right was clearly 
established and one of which a reasonable person would have known; and (3) 
whether the official’s action was objectively unreasonable under the 
circumstances.”19 Id. at 15 (citing Harris v. Bornhorst, 513 F.3d 503, 511 (6th 
Cir. 2008)). Applying this analysis to Corporal Huff’s removal of Mr. Goldson 
from the police cruiser places the emphasize on objective variables rather than 
on Corporal Huff’s discretion. 
Judge Moore approached the first prong by considering whether “various 
factors that our caselaw mentions in justifying similar uses of force are present 
here.”20 Id. at 15. These factors are whether or not the recipient of the force (1) 
was secured, (2) had refused the officer’s command to exit the vehicle, and (3) 
was in a vehicle with “unknown, potentially dangerous contents inside.”21 Id. at 
15–16. Mr. Goldson was handcuffed behind his back while secured in leg 
shackles and a transport belt when Corporal Huff, without warning, removed 
him “from a law-enforcement vehicle in which the inmate had already been 
secured.”22 Id. at 16. Judge Moore concluded that Corporal Huff clearly 
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“employed excessive force in removing Goldson from the vehicle.”23 Bard, 370 
F.3d at 17. 
The second prong considers whether the violated right was clearly 
established. Judge Moore cites the Supreme Court for “the general proposition 
that use of force is contrary to the Fourth Amendment if it is excessive under 
objective standards of reasonableness.”24 Id. (citing Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 
194, 201-02 (2001)). Judge Moore’s conclusion on the first prong necessitated 
that the second prong was also met. 
The final prong seeks to further inject objectivity into the analysis and asks 
whether Corporal Huff’s actions were objectively reasonable under the 
circumstances. Judge Moore turned to precedent to determine whether pulling a 
restrained inmate out of a vehicle so that his upper body would fall to the floor 
was a reasonable use of force. After citing three other cases suggesting this use 
of force was excessive, the final case cited offered a bright-line rule: “A 
reasonable officer would understand that, after compliance is secured and a 
threat is no longer posed, force should not be employed.”25 Id. at 18 (citing Cole 
v. City of Dearborn, 448 F. App’x 571, 576 (6th Cir. 2011)). Based on this 
precedent, Judge Moore concluded that all three prongs were met, and Corporal 
Huff should not have been granted qualified immunity. 
Ultimately, the district court’s grant of qualified immunity prevailed due to 
procedural deficiencies on appeal, but Judge Moore’s analysis is a valuable 
contribution to the larger issue of what standard law-enforcement is held to. Is 
Corporal Huff entitled to substantial discretion in giving Mr. Goldson a 
“welcome party” as retaliation for the attack on Deputy Justice? Should a law-
enforcement officer be granted substantial discretion when he kneels on your 
neck for almost eight minutes? Or can that conduct be viewed as objectively 
unreasonable?  
If all that is required is that law-enforcement officers be less morally 
blameworthy than suspects and inmates, then perhaps justice is served. But 
holding law-enforcement officers to such a low standard is an insult to the 
uniform and the overwhelming number of honorable individuals in law-
enforcement. Watching the video of Corporal Huff’s removal of Mr. Goldson 
from the police cruiser does not reflect the good order and discipline that should 
be demanded of our thin blue line. Those entrusted to enforce the law are not 
above it. 
Demanding that law-enforcement be held accountable is easy, but how can 
they be expected to follow the law when judges are unable to agree what the law 
is? Judge Moore’s three-pronged analysis draws on precedent to delineate 
unacceptable conduct in a defined way that can be used to train other officers. 
Maintaining the district court’s emphasis on substantial discretion entrenches 
the status quo and is getting harder to defend. If the argument is that people 
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make mistakes and there are a few bad apples, then the response should be that 
mistakes have consequences and bad apples that are not thrown out spoil the 
bushel. The nature of law-enforcement does not lend itself to a comprehensive 
list of bright-line rules but establishing them when they are practical will help 
officers abide by them and protects the general public from abuse. 
 
